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and its relevance for Russian foreign policy today
Tom Casier
Brussels School of International Studies, University of Kent
t.casier@kent.ac.uk
Abstract:
At the end of the 1980s the Soviet Unions last leader, Mikhail Gorbachev, launched 
WKHLGHDRIDµ&RPPRQ(XURSHDQ+RPH¶,WZDVSDUWRIKLVFDPSDLJQIRU1HZ3ROLWLFDO
Thinking in foreign policy, which aimed to deideologise the Soviet approach to interna-
WLRQDOD൵DLUVDQGSRVLWLRQHGWKHFRXQWU\¿UPO\ZLWKLQD(XURSHDQSROLWLFDOFRPPXQLW\
and civilisation. While the concept Common European Home has faded away with the 
Soviet Union, many of its supporting ideas resonate in Russias foreign policy discourse 
under Putin. Four similarities stand out: the preference for a multipolar Europe without 
dividing lines, indivisible and collective pan-European security, free trade from Lisbon 
to Vladivostok and intra-European relations founded on international law. But some fun-
damental characteristics have changed. First, the context of Russian-European relations 
has altered substantially and many ideas are now used in an antagonistic context, to 
reject Euro-Atlantic hegemony. Even if the wording often remains similar, the emphasis 
LVQRZRQ5XVVLD¶VVRYHUHLJQDQGLQGHSHQGHQWSDWK6HFRQGO\WKHFRUHLGHDRIDXQL¿HG
European civilisation has been replaced by the notion of competition between civilisa-
tions. Hereby Russia claims to represent genuine European values, giving the latter a 
strongly conservative interpretation. Finally, the Eurasian turn in Russian foreign policy 
has undermined the centrality of Europe in its discourse. Rather than envisaging a col-
laborative Europe, Russian and EU integration initiatives are seen as rivalling. This evo-
lution of Russias vision on Europe did not change abruptly with Putins ascent to power 
but built up gradually in the decade before the Ukraine crisis, against a background of 
escalating tensions and growing distrust.
Keywords: *RUEDFKHYµ&RPPRQ(XURSHDQ+RPH¶1HZ3ROLWLFDO7KLQNLQJ3XWLQ
Russia, European Union 
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Victor Hugo said that the day would come when you, France, you, Russia, you, Italy, 
you, England, you Germany  all of you, all the nations of the continent  will, 
without losing your distinguishing features and your splendid distinctiveness, merge in-




In the late 1980s Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev made the headlines launching the 
FRQFHSWµ&RPPRQ(XURSHDQ+RPH¶DPHWDSKRUIRUDXQL¿HGSDQ(XURSHDQVSDFHLQZKLFK
West and East would cooperate while maintaining their diversity. What is the relevance of 
this concept for todays Russian foreign policy discourse? Which lessons can be drawn for 
contemporary pan-European relations? Since tensions culminated into the Ukraine crisis 
(Haukkala, 2015), relations between Russia and the Euro-Atlantic community have found 
themselves in the deepest crisis since the end of the Soviet Union. The idea of a Common 
European Home, an architecture for pan-European security and cooperation based on a bal-
ance of interests and common values, seems further than ever. Yet, it makes sense to revisit 
WKHFRQFHSW0DQ\LGHDVEHKLQGWKLVYDJXHO\GH¿QHGWHUPKDYHFRQWLQXHGWRDSSHDULQODWHU
Russian foreign policy rhetoric. However, as will be argued in this article, the context has 
changed substantially and with it the meaning that is given to these ideas. 
The article starts by revisiting Gorbachevs concept of Common European Home and 
VLWXDWHVLWLQKLVUDGLFDOUHIRUPRI6RYLHWIRUHLJQSROLF\$IWHUWKDWVLPLODULWLHVDQGGL൵HU-
ences are explored between this concept and Russias European policy under Putin. The 
emphasis is on the change of foreign policy discourse and relies on a comparative analysis 
of the conceptualisation of Europe  and Russias relative position to it  in various For-
eign Policy Concepts of the Russian Federation.  
1. Revisiting Gorbachevs Common European Home
1.1. New Political Thinking
Gorbachevs reform policy in the second half of the 1980s was sustained by three dif-
ferent pillars. Two of them still resonate in most languages: glasnost and perestroyka. The 
¿UVWUHIHUVWRWKH6RYLHWOHDGHU¶VFDPSDLJQWRFUHDWHRSHQQHVVDQGODWHURQGHPRFUDWLVD-
WLRQ7KHVHFRQGUHIHUVWRDSROLF\RIUHVWUXFWXULQJ¿UVWKHVLWDQWHFRQRPLFUHIRUPVODWHU
on drastic liberal reforms. The third pillar does not resonate as strongly, in lack of a simple 
Russian catchword, but was probably the most important of all: New Political Thinking. It 
ZDVLQWKH¿HOGRIIRUHLJQSROLF\DQGLQWHUQDWLRQDOUHODWLRQVWKDWWKH8665XQGHUZHQWLWV
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most spectacular change, leading to a reversal of the Soviet foreign policy doctrine and a 
far reaching de-ideologisation. Within this broad framework Gorbachev used the concept 
RIµ&RPPRQ(XURSHDQ+RPH¶DV\PEROLFDOO\SRZHUIXOWHUP±ERUGHULQJRQXWRSLDQ±
rather than a detailed blueprint for a new pan-European order. 
Until Gorbachevs reforms, Soviet foreign policy had been framed in strong ideologi-
FDOWHUPV,WZDVGRPLQDWHGE\WKHµWZRFDPSGRFWULQH¶GDWLQJEDFNWRWKHHDUO\6RYLHW
\HDUVUHJDUGLQJWKHZRUOGDV³GH¿QLWHO\DQGLUUHYRFDEO\VSOLWLQWRWZRFDPSVWKHFDPSRI
imperialism and the camp of socialism  [and the struggle between them]  constitutes 
WKHKXERISUHVHQWGD\D൵DLUVGHWHUPLQHVWKHZKROHVXEVWDQFHRIWKHSUHVHQWKRPHDQG
foreign policies of the leaders of the old and the new world (Stalin quoted in Kubálková 
and Cruickshank, 2015). This doctrine was a projection of the class struggle onto the in-
ternational level. In the same way as the class struggle between proletariat and bourgeoi-
sie was inevitable, the struggle between capitalism and socialism was unavoidable. Along 
the same pattern socialism would in the end be victorious. Later on, in particular during 
WKHGpWHQWHWKLVYLHZZDVQXDQFHGWRWKDWRIµSHDFHIXOFRH[LVWHQFH¶EHWZHHQERWKFDPSV
Rather than overruling the idea of an inevitable struggle, it took it to a new level, that of 
competition in various domains, including ideological, economic and cultural.
The New Political Thinking of the second half of the 1980s constituted a radical break 
with this ideological approach. It was built on three assumptions about international rela-
tions. First, the world had become increasingly interdependent. Secondly, global problems 
forced all countries to cooperate. This cooperation had become a matter of survival, be-
cause of the threat of nuclear annihilation and common ecological threats. Thirdly, war 
between capitalist countries was no longer seen as inevitable. Capitalist economies could 
develop without militarisation and development could be reached through disarmament. 
As a result, the Marxist-Leninist theory of imperialism needed to be adjusted.
On this basis Gorbachev developed a radically new view of international relations in 
ZKLFKµKXPDQYDOXHV¶DQGWKHVXUYLYDORIPDQNLQGKDGDEVROXWHSULRULW\,QWHUQDWLRQDO
cooperation (not just peaceful coexistence) was to replace the two camp vision. Finally, 
there was a need for a system of universal security. In terms of military doctrine this was 
WUDQVODWHGLQWRWKHSULQFLSOHRI³UHDVRQDEOHVX൶FLHQF\´RIPLOLWDU\FDSDELOLWLHVDQG³GHIHQ-
sive defence (Gorbachev, 1988). Many of these ideas were developed in his speeches and 
writings, mainly his book 3HUHVWUR\ND (Gorbachev, 1987). The rupture with the traditional 
ideological framing of foreign policy could hardly be bigger. With the change of emphasis 
IURPFODVVWRKXPDQLWDULDQLVPWKHUHLVQR¿HOGLQZKLFKZHZLWQHVVHGDPRUH³GUDPDWLF
deleninisation (Sakwa, 1990, p. 322) than in foreign policy. But the New Political Thinking 
went well beyond words and was translated into unseen diplomatic demarches, such as the 
far reaching unilateral disarmament the Soviet leader proposed in his speech at the United 
Nations in 1988 (Gorbachev, 1988). Gorbachev also stressed the need to democratise in-
ternational relations and the right of any state to make sovereign choices. The latter would 
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the socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe had the right to do it their own way 
(Kull, 1992, pp. 139-140). This message was not misunderstood in countries like Poland, 
where the governments started round table talks with the opposition, or in Hungary, where 
the authorities dismantled the iron curtain. Both events set into motion the radical changes 
of 1989 and the eventual collapse of the communist regimes in the satellite states. 
1.2. The European Common Home
It is within this context that Gorbachevs proposal for a Common European Home 
needs to be situated. The term is mostly associated with his address to the Parliamen-
tary Assembly of the Council of Europe in 1989 (Gorbachev 1989), which was entirely 
devoted to this theme. Yet, he used the term earlier and even prior to becoming Secre-
tary-General of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU), in a speech in Lon-
don in 1984 (Rey, 2004, p. 34).1 Over time the concept developed from an image and a 
metaphor to a proposal for a pan-European architecture. Yet, it never took the form of 
a detailed blueprint and lacked substance (Sakwa, 2014, p. 252). Like New Political 
7KLQNLQJLWUHÀHFWVWKHDPELWLRQWRGHLGHRORJLVHLQWHUQDWLRQDOSROLWLFV.XOODQG
is profoundly idealistic (Rey, 2004, p. 39).
In Strasbourg Gorbachev stated:
 Europeans can meet the challenges of the coming century only by pooling their ef-
forts. We are convinced that what they need is one Europe  peaceful and democrat-
ic, a Europe that maintains all its diversity and common humanistic ideas, a prosper-
RXV(XURSHWKDWH[WHQGVLWVKDQGWRWKHUHVWRIWKHZRUOG$(XURSHWKDWFRQ¿GHQWO\
advances into the future. It is in such a Europe that we visualise our own future. 
(Gorbachev, 1989)
7KHFRPPLWPHQWWR(XURSHZDVLQWKH¿UVWSODFHDSUR(XURSHDQVWDQFHDFRQ¿UPD-
tion of the Soviet Union as a European country. The idea of a Common European Home 
DVSUHVHQWHGE\*RUEDFKHYPD\KDYHODFNHGVXEVWDQFHEXWLWUHÀHFWHGWKHSRZHUIXODV-
piration of the Soviet leader for his country to join the European political mainstream as 
part of a shared civilisation and political community (Sakwa, 2014, p. 252). It was a plea 
for a united, peaceful, integrated European continent.
5H\DOVRQRWHVWKDWWKHWHUPµ&RPPRQ(XURSHDQ+RPH¶KDVHDUOLHUEHHQXVHGE\*URP\NRLQ
and Brezhnev in 1981 (Rey, 2004, p. 34).
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At the heart of the concept of Common European Home is a restructuring of the in-
ternational order existing in Europe that would put the European common values in the 
forefront and make it possible to replace the traditional balance of forces with a balance of 
interests (Gorbachev, 1989). It is a house with several rooms, representing heterogeneity. 
Unity in diversity is key (Kull, 1992, pp. 146-147). It represents a multipolar, pluralistic 
vision of Europe, without centre of power (Sakwa, 2014, p. 27). 
As stated, the Common European Home concept was all but a blueprint for the aspired 
pan-European order, but at some instances Gorbachev got into more detail. The house 
FDQEHUHSUHVHQWHGDVFRQVLVWLQJRIIRXUGL൵HUHQWOHYHOV5H\RQWKHEDVLVRIWKUHH
speeches by Gorbachev). The Helsinki geopolitical order (including the recognition of 
ERUGHUVIRUPHGWKHIRXQGDWLRQVRIWKHKRXVH7KH¿UVWOHYHOZDVEDVHGRQFROOHFWLYHVH-
curity and maximal disarmament. In the longer term it provided for the disappearance of 
alliances, which was later reframed as their transformation into political organizations 
that could actively contribute to the rapprochement (Rey, 2004, p. 40). The second level 
UHSUHVHQWHGWKHSHDFHIXOUHVROXWLRQRIFRQÀLFWVWKHWKLUGHFRQRPLFDQGWUDGHFRRSHUDWLRQ
and the fourth a European cultural community. 
,QKLV6WUDVERXUJVSHHFK*RUEDFKHYXVHGDVRPHZKDWGL൵HUHQWPHWDSKRUFDOOLQJ
security the foundation of a common European home and all-round cooperation  
its bearing frame (Gorbachev, 1989). He also suggested that the Common European 
Home should be thought of as a community rooted in law (Gorbachev, 1989). Fur-
ther, he added ecological, humanitarian, cultural and economic dimensions. As to the 
latter he called for the emergence of a vast economic space from the Atlantic to the 
Urals where Eastern and Western parts would be strongly interlocked (Gorbachev, 
1989). The US and Canada were not part of the Common European Home, but were 
seen as fully associated with the project (Rey, 2004, p. 39). The latter broke with the 
traditional Soviet ambition to decouple the US and Western Europe (Rey, 2004, p. 37), 
which would have made the project an easy target for Western critique. 
The political translation of Gorbachevs idea of a Common European Home has been 
rather weak, despite the fact that it evolved from an image for public diplomacy purposes 
WRPRUHVSHFL¿FSURSRVDOVWRHVWDEOLVKDSDQ(XURSHDQSROLWLFDORUJDQLVDWLRQDQGGHVSLWH
the increasingly positive reception in France and Germany. The rapid developments from 
1989 to 1991 overtook Gorbachevs plans. In 1989 regimes changed in Central and East-
ern Europe. Post-communist regimes sought membership of NATO and steered towards 
a rupture with the Soviet Union, rather than aspiring to occupy one of the rooms in the 
Common European Home. NATO would thus be reinforced rather than dissolved or trans-
formed, as hoped for, while simultaneously the Warsaw Pact crumbled. On top of that, 
WKHTXHVWLRQRI*HUPDQXQL¿FDWLRQGRPLQDWHGWKHDJHQGDOHDGLQJWRGLVDJUHHPHQWVRYHU
whether there should be two German rooms in the European house and later whether a 
united Germany could be a NATO member. On top of that, Gorbachevs reforms ran into 
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disarray, facing both demands for more drastic change and increasing internal opposition, 
eventually throwing the USSR into instability in 1991.
$UJXDEO\WKH&6&(µ&KDUWHURI3DULVIRUD1HZ(XURSH¶RIUHÀHFWVVRPHRIWKH
ideas of a Common European Home most closely. The preamble stated:
Europe is liberating itself from the legacy of the past. The courage of men and women, 
the strength of the will of the peoples and the power of the ideas of the Helsinki Final 
Act have opened a new era of democracy, peace and unity in Europe. Ours is a time 
IRUIXO¿OOLQJWKHKRSHVDQGH[SHFWDWLRQVRXUSHRSOHVKDYHFKHULVKHGIRUGHFDGHVVWHDG-
fast commitment to democracy based on human rights and fundamental freedoms; 
prosperity through economic liberty and social justice; and equal security for all our 
countries. (Charter of Paris, 1990)
The charter breathes a spirit of cooperation and unity of Europe. Like the Common Eu-
ropean Home project, it went beyond the Helsinki Final Acts ambition of peaceful coexist-
ence, calling for a substantial cooperation. Equally like the Common European Home idea, 
the Charter remained rather vague. Its real political impact was quickly overshadowed by the 
bigger items on the agenda: the eastward extension of existing Euro-Atlantic international 
VWUXFWXUHV1$72DQGWKH(80RUHRYHUWKH&KDUWHUFRQ¿UPHGWKHSDUWLFLSDWLRQRIWKH86
and Canada as fundamental, not as simply associated as Soviet foreign policy wanted it. 
7KH6LJQL¿FDQFHRIWKH&RPPRQ(XURSHDQ+RPHIRU5XVVLDQ)RUHLJQ3ROLF\7RGD\
Fast forward from the Gorbachev years to the 25th anniversary of the collapse of the 
Berlin wall. In the aftermath of the eruption of the Ukraine crisis, earlier in 2014, the ar-
chitect of the Common European Home held a gloomy speech about the advent of a new 
Cold War and blamed it on Western triumphalism: 
The end of the Cold War was just the beginning of the path towards a new Europe and a 
safer world order. But, instead of building new mechanisms and institutions of European 
security and pursuing a major demilitarization of European politics  as promised, inci-
dentally, in NATOs London Declaration  the West, and particularly the United States, 
declared victory in the Cold War. Euphoria and triumphalism went to the heads of West-
ern leaders. Taking advantage of Russias weakening and the lack of a counterweight, 
they claimed monopoly leadership and domination in the world, refusing to heed words 
of caution from many of those present here. The events of the past few months [related 
to the Ukraine crisis] are consequences of short-sighted policies, of seeking to impose 
ones will and faits accomplis while ignoring the interests of ones partners.  To put 
it metaphorically, a blister has now turned into a bloody, festering wound.  And who 
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LVVX൵HULQJWKHPRVWIURPZKDW¶VKDSSHQLQJ",WKLQNWKHDQVZHULVPRUHWKDQFOHDU,WLV
Europe, our common home. Instead of becoming a leader of change in a global world, 
Europe has turned into an arena of political upheaval, of competition for spheres of in-
ÀXHQFHDQG¿QDOO\RIPLOLWDU\FRQÀLFW*RUEDFKHY
,QWKLVFRQWH[WZKDWLVWKHVLJQL¿FDQFHRIWKH&RPPRQ(XURSHDQ+RPHIRU5XVVLD¶V
foreign policy discourse on Europe today? To what extent have elements been retained? 
Despite the disappearance of the concept itself, quite some terms are strikingly similar. 
%XWLWJRHVZLWKRXWVD\LQJWKDWWKHUHDUHDOVRVXEVWDQWLDOGL൵HUHQFHV7KHQH[WVHFWLRQV
compare Russian foreign policy rhetoric under Putin with that of the Common European 
Home. On the basis of the Foreign Policy Concepts and other central documents it lists 
VLPLODULWLHVDQGGL൵HUHQFHV6HOIHYLGHQWO\WKHVHOHFWLRQLVQRWH[KDXVWLYH
3. Constant ideas
In the Russian Foreign Policy Concept of 2008  more than 8 years after Putins as-
FHQWWRSRZHU±LWLVVWDWHG³5XVVLDFDOOVIRUEXLOGLQJDWUXO\XQL¿HG(XURSHZLWKRXWGLYL-
sive lines through equal interaction between Russia, the European Union and the United 
States (Foreign Policy Concept, 2008, p. 20). The phrasing is very similar to that of Gor-
EDFKHY%XWDOVRZKHQZHORRNDWVRPHVSHFL¿FVWKHUHDUHPRUHPDWFKHVWKDQRQHZRXOG
expect. Four in particular need to be mentioned: multipolar Europe, indivisible security, 
pan-European free trade and a legal basis for intra-European relations.
3.1. Multipolar Europe
The idea of a multipolar European continent has been a constant factor in Russian post-
communist foreign policy. The idea that the Russian Federation would be one of the key play-
ers in a new Europe went hand in hand with the ambition to regain status after the crumbling 
RIWKH6RYLHW8QLRQ5LFKDUG6DNZDGHVFULEHVWKH5XVVLDQSRVW&ROG:DUSURMHFWDVµ*UHDWHU
Europe. It is a vision of a continental Europe, stretching from Lisbon to Vladivostok, that 
has multiple centres, including Brussels, Moscow and Ankara, but with a common purpose 
in overcoming the divisions that have traditionally plagued the continent (Sakwa, 2014, p. 




latter project sees power as unipolar, symbolically concentrated in Brussels (where the head-
quarters of NATO and most EU institutions are based), from where concentric circles ema-
nate over the continent. Initially Russia was willing to accept Euro-Atlantic leadership, in the 
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HDUO\VWKURXJKDQ$PHULFD¿UVWSROLF\ODWHULQWKHVDPHGHFDGHE\SULRULWLVLQJWKH(8
as its primary partner (Medium-term Strategy, 1989). 
Under Putin the ambition of a close partnership with the EU did not really disappear. 
,QKLV¿UVWWHUPDV3UHVLGHQW5XVVLDDQGWKH(8HQWHUHGLQWRD6WUDWHJLF3DUWQHUVKLSDQG
agreed on Four Common Spaces of cooperation at their summit meeting in St. Peters-
burg in 2003. Yet, increasingly Moscow started to reject Euro-Atlantic leadership. Argu-
ably, the contours of an independent course crystallised around 2004-2007. The emphasis 
VKLIWHGWRZKDW*RUEDFKHYFDOOHGDµEDODQFHRILQWHUHVWV¶DSDUWQHUVKLSWKDWSURPLVHVWR
recognise mutual interest, rather than based on a community of shared values. One could 
VHHWKLVHYROXWLRQDVDGL൵HUHQWZD\RI5XVVLDWRDFKLHYHVWDWXVHQKDQFHPHQW)UHLUH
Larson ad Shevchenko, 2014). While throughout the 1990s it was aiming to regain great 
power status by trying to be an acceptable partner within a Euro-Atlantic Community of 
states, it changed towards a strategy of pursuing its interests more independently. This 
change of course is partly due to domestic changes in Russia, but to a bigger extent to the 
increasing frustration of not receiving the recognition as a great power and equal partner. 
3.2. Security: indivisible and collective
When it comes to security, the standard in Russian post-communist foreign policy 
documents is and remains the need for an equitable and indivisible system of pan-
European security (Foreign Policy Concept, 2013, art. 62). Also in his Munich speech 
RI3XWLQUHIHUUHGWRWKHµXQLYHUVDOLQGLYLVLEOHFKDUDFWHURIVHFXULW\¶3XWLQ
This recurring thought in Russian foreign policy mirrors Gorbachevs New Political 
Thinking. Yet, while in the context of Gorbachev, the point of departure was a bipolar 
international system, for Putin the concept clearly becomes a way of objecting to the 
unipolar system, dominated by the US. 
The system preferred on these grounds is a pan-European collective security system 
(see for example Mid-term Strategy, 1999; Foreign Policy Concept, 2008; National Secu-
rity Concept, 2015). In the Mid-term strategy of 1999, Moscow still saw the OSCE as the 
platform for such a security system. Yet, soon after that Russias love for the organisation 
cooled down and Moscow regularly accused it of applying double standards in favour of 
the West. Moreover, the OSCE represented a fairly weak collective security system, op-
erating in the shadow of NATO as collective defence organisation. The OSCEs role as a 
basis for building a collective security system did not disappear from Russian discourse 
altogether but was accompanied by calls to reform the OSCE.
Under Medvedevs presidency, the emphasis changed. Medvedev presented in 2009 a 
draft European Security Treaty, where he suggested the merger of NATO and the CSTO 
(Collective Security Treaty Organisation) into a pan-European collective security system 
(European Security Treaty, 2009). This was a largely symbolic proposal, politely received 
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and rapidly shelved by the Euro-Atlantic community. The similarity with Gorbachevs 
idea to transform the military alliances (then NATO and Warsaw Pact) into organisations 
for rapprochement in a collective security system is striking. Medvedevs proposal under-
lined that the idea of a pan-European collective security system without military alliances 
continued to be high on the Russian wish list. 
3.3. Economic and trade cooperation
Ever since the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) came into force in 
1997, the creation of a Free Trade Area between Russia and the EU has been declared a 
formal objective of EU-Russia collaboration (Partnership and Cooperation Agreement 
1997). The objective was repeated and reinforced in the framework of a Common Eco-
nomic Space, one of the Four Common Spaces agreed in 2003 and translated into Road-
maps in 2005. Again, this idea is by no means new. As mentioned above, Gorbachev 
referred to the creation of an economic space from the Atlantic to the Urals as part of 
KLV&RPPRQ(XURSHDQ+RPHSURMHFW7KHIRUPXODWLRQPD\KDYHEHHQVOLJKWO\GL൵HUHQW
the core idea was identical to the later oft used call to establish a common economic 
VSDFHµIURP/LVERQWR9ODGLYRVWRN¶
<HWSURJUHVVLQWKLV¿HOGKDVEHHQH[WUHPHO\OLPLWHG7KH3&$ZKLFKHQWHUHGLQWRIRUFH
in 1997, was agreed for a period of ten years. With the expiry date approaching Moscow 
and Brussels started negotiating a new, enhanced agreement to replace the PCA. They 
failed to make tangible progress towards a Free Trade Area and the PCA was therefore 
silently prolonged, as provided by the treaty. 
+RZHYHUIDUR൵LWPD\VHHPQRZDSDQ(XURSHDQIUHHWUDGHDUHDFRXOGKDYHKHOSHG
to resolve the incompatibility of membership of the Eurasian Economic Union and a free 
trade deal with the EU. It was this incompatibility that forced countries like Ukraine and 
Armenia to make a choice between Russia and the EU  a choice which in the case of Kyiv 
contributed to polarisation and turmoil.
3.4. International Law
Gorbachev emphasised the importance of international law as a basis both for inter-
national relations and for the Common European Home. This theme keeps on resonating 
throughout Russian post-communist foreign policy rhetoric. The Foreign Policy Concept 
of 2016, for example, states: Russia consistently advocates strengthening the legal founda-
tion of international relations and complies with its international legal obligations in good 
faith (Foreign Policy Concept, 2016, art. 26) In the current context the universal respect for 
LQWHUQDWLRQDOUXOHVDQGQRUPVLVRIWHQFRQIURQWHGZLWKWKHLPSRVLWLRQRIµGLFWDWHV¶E\³DQ
elite club of [Western] countries (Lavrov, 2017). It goes without saying that the credibility 
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of the Russian discourse on respect for universal legal principles got seriously damaged 
by the annexation of Crimea in 2014, despite Putins attempt to invoke Kosovo as a legal 
precedent. Russia also referred to the right of self-determination of Crimea and the defence 
of the rights of the Russian minorities to justify its intervention legally. These ambiguities 
notwithstanding, respect for international law continues to be a linchpin in Russias foreign 
policy discourse (Foreign Policy Concept, 2000, 2008, 2013, 2016). Moscow has repeatedly 
called to base relations with the EU on a solid legal basis. 
'L൵HUHQFHV
'HVSLWHWKHVWULNLQJVLPLODULWLHVLQWHUPVRIWHUPLQRORJ\WKHUHDUHLPSRUWDQWGL൵HU-
ences between the Gorbachev project of a Common European Home and the formulation 
of a post-communist European policy under Putin. Many aspects could be mentioned, 
such as the decreasing role of disarmament,2 the ecological dimension or the disappear-
DQFHRIDYDOXHEDVHGIUDPLQJ7KUHHIXQGDPHQWDOGL൵HUHQFHVZLOOEHXQGHUOLQHG)LUVW
the new context of relations between Russia and the EU, which has changed the meaning 
DQGSXUSRVHRIVRPHPHWDSKRUV6HFRQGO\WKHGLVDSSHDUDQFHRIWKHLGHDRIDXQL¿HG(X-
ropean cultural community or civilisation. Finally, the Eurasian turn in Russian foreign 
policy, which has changed the importance of Europe in its foreign policy discourse. All 
these changes have to be understood in a context of gradually escalating tensions with 
the West, whereby a mutual logic of competition and distrust gained ground and under-
mined collaborative relations.3 
4.1. New context, new meaning
Metaphors get a certain meaning in a given context. When Gorbachev spoke about a Com-
PRQ(XURSHDQ+RPHKHGLGVRZLWKWKHDPELWLRQWREULGJHGHHSGL൵HUHQFHVLQDELSRODU
system. It was a time of progressive reconciliation between the Soviet Union and the West 
and of exceptional optimism, in which Gorbachev spoke to a generally well willing Western 
audience. He framed the project as part of his bigger project of deideologising Russian foreign 
policy and international relations (Kull, 1992). Today, and clearly since Putins Munich speech 
RI3XWLQWKHFRQWH[WLVVXEVWDQWLDOO\GL൵HUHQW$IWHUWKHFROODSVHRIWKH6RYLHW
Union and the disastrous 1990s, Russia has been seeking to make a comeback, claiming great 
power status, but got increasingly frustrated over the lack of recognition thereof. The context 
was one of dwindling trust in relations with the Euro-Atlantic Community, rather than the 
sharp increase of trust we witnessed in the Gorbachev days. Relations became increasingly 
7KH)RUHLJQ3ROLF\&RQFHSWRIVWDWHVWKDWµWKH5XVVLDQ)HGHUDWLRQVHHNVWREULQJWKHFRQYHQ-
tional arms control regime in Europe in line with current realities (Foreign Policy Concept, 2016, art. 30).
3 For an analysis of the reasons behind this escalating logic of competition, see Casier, 2016.
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determined by a negative logic of competition (Casier, 2016), which eventually culminated 
in the confrontation over Ukraine (Haukkala, 2015). The emphasis in Russian foreign policy 
discourse was on sovereignty: Russia was no longer prepared to follow the path the West 
prescribed, but had the right to follow its own path independently. Also domestically, the con-
WH[WFKDQJHGVLJQL¿FDQWO\*RUEDFKHY¶VUHIRUPLVWDSSURDFKZDVFDUULHGE\DFRPPXQLW\RI
mezhdunarodniki (International Relations experts) (Rey, 2006) and foreign policy school of 
µ:HVWHUQL]HUV¶7V\JDQNRYSSXVKLQJIRUVXEVWDQWLDOUHIRUPV3XWLQRQWKHFRQWUDU\
had to balance a coalition between Statists (to whom state capabilities, sovereignty and sta-
tus are key) and Civilisationists (who see Russia as culturally distinct from the West), with 
WKHODWWHUKDYLQJEHFRPHLQFUHDVLQJO\LQÀXHQWLDOGXULQJKLVFXUUHQWWHUP7V\JDQNRY 
At the same time the political system had turned increasingly repressive and less democratic. 
As a result, the debate about pan-European cooperation got decoupled from issues of democ-
racy and human rights  in sharp contrast to the Gorbachev days when both went hand in hand. 
In sum, the current context is profoundly negative. Trust is at its deepest since the end of 
the Soviet Union. Russia and the West tend to read each other's behaviour in negative zero-
sum terms. There are few prospects to reverse the spiral of competition. This implies that 
many of the concepts which Gorbachev used as positive concepts, as platform for collabo-
ration, have now often become defensive vestiges within a broader discourse of rejecting a 
Western dictate and acting against NATO-centric egotism (Lavrov, 2016).
4.2. European civilisation
$VHFRQGVXEVWDQWLDOGL൵HUHQFHKDVWRGRZLWKWKHXQGHUVWDQGLQJRI(XURSHDQFLYLOLVD-
tion and Russias place within it. Gorbachev put a strong emphasis on a European cultural 
community and civilisation, transcending the continents heterogeneity. Over time also 
the Russian Foreign Policy Concepts repeatedly refer to civilisations and Russia being 
an integral and inseparable part of the European civilization (example taken from For-
eign Policy Concept, 2013, art. 56). But there is a certain ambiguity. At the same time an 
emphasis is put on inter-civilisational relations and the need to harmonise them. The em-
phasis is always on dialogue and avoiding dividing lines (Foreign Policy Concept, 2013, 
art. 14). This ambiguity seems to suggest that Russia is situating itself both apart from 
and within a European civilisation: Russia stands ready to play a constructive role in 
ensuring a civilizational compatibility of Europe (Foreign Policy Concept, 2008, p. 20).4 
Overall, Russias relation in or to a European civilisation has taken a more antagonistic 
turn in recent years, when Russia and Western Europe got presented as competing civilisa-
tions. Tsygankov detects a revival of civilizational thinking in Russia, where the idea that 
Russia forms a distinct civilisation gained ground (Tsygankov, 2016, p. 150). As of 2012 
4 In the post-Ukraine Foreign Policy Concept of 2016, the reference to Russia as part of a European 
civilisation has disappeared (Foreign Policy Concept, 2016).
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3XWLQVWDUWHGDGYDQFLQJWKHLGHDRIµVWDWHFLYLOL]DWLRQ¶LQZKLFKHWKQLF5XVVLDQVIRUPWKH
central and binding force of Russia as civilisation and state, while at the same time recognis-
ing the diversity of Russia and rejecting the idea of a mono-ethnic state (Tsygankov, 2016, 
p. 151). At international level this gets translated into the idea of a global competition  on 
a civilizational level, whereby various values and models of development based on the uni-
versal principles of democracy and market economy start to clash and compete against each 
other (Foreign Policy Concept, 2013, art. 13). This approach has been reinforced because 
of domestic development and as a result of the Wests Ukraine policy and sanctions against 
Russia in 2014. Putin also started criticising Europes departure from traditional religious 
and family values (Tsygankov, 2016, p. 151). In certain elite circles this discourse is even 
more prominent and radical. Russia presents itself as a defender of Europes civilisation. The 
interpretation of what this European civilisation stands for is a very selective one, emphasis-
ing certain traditional and spiritual values. Morozov speaks of a paleoconservative ideol-
RJ\WDNLQJWKHXSSHUKDQGLQ5XVVLDQGRPHVWLFSROLWLFV´0RUR]RYS'L൵HUHQWO\
from conservatives, paleoconservatives reject modernity altogether. Morozov states: 
 the radicalisation of Russias position through the espousal of the paleoconservati-
ve ideology and the intervention in Ukraine must be interpreted as the decisive break 
ZLWKWKHSDWWHUQRIµKLHUDUFKLFDOLQFOXVLRQ¶RI5XVVLDLQ(XURSH«:KLOHWKHOLEHUDOV
and the moderate conservatives of the previous decade had been complaining about 
Russias unequal treatment by the EU, todays paleoconservatives have embraced the 
image of Russia as a traditionalist sovereign power and, in that sense, the opposite of 
Europe with its moral decadence and helplessness in the face of repeated crises. (Mo-
rozov, 2018, p. 36)
In other words, today, the idea of European civilisation itself is contested. Russia has 
started to challenge the EUs dominant position in determining European identity. Coun-
WHULQJWKLVKHJHPRQ\0RVFRZFODLPVWKDWLWVWDQGVIRUWKHµJHQXLQH¶YDOXHVRI(XURSHD
very conservative interpretation of these values) reproaching West-European countries 
of betraying the fundamental values of European civilisation. The latter has thus become 
DQREMHFWRIFRPSHWLWLRQUDWKHUWKDQRIXQL¿FDWLRQ7KLVLVDYHU\IXQGDPHQWDOGL൵HUHQFH
with Gorbachevs unifying concept of Common European Home.
(XURSH¿UVW"
7KHWKLUGVXEVWDQWLDOGL൵HUHQFHKDVWRGRZLWKWKHLPSRUWDQFHRI(XURSHLQIRUHLJQSRO-
icy. For Gorbachev the Common European Home was a central concept, a frame to reorient 
the Soviet foreign policy towards close cooperation within greater Europe. The countries of 
Western Europe and the European Community were the preferred partners and the US and 
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Canada were to be associated at best. Interregional links between the European Commu-
nity and the Comecon/CMEA (Council for Mutual Economic Assistance) played a key role 
in the common home. A decade later, in 1999, the Mid-term Strategy prioritised the EU 
DVNH\SDUWQHUDQGWKHUHODWLRQVKLSEHWZHHQERWKDFWRUVZDVHYHQWXDOO\VROLGL¿HGWKURXJK
the EU-Russia Strategic Partnership. The latter grew into the EUs most institutionalised 
relationship: with no country did the EU have more frequent high-level meetings than with 
Russia. Despite rising tensions this link continued to exist until the Ukraine crisis and an-
nexation of Crimea, when the EU suspended the Strategic Partnership.
:KLOHWKHWHUPµ&RPPRQ(XURSHDQ+RPH¶GLVDSSHDUHGIURPR൶FLDOVWDWHPHQWV5XV-
sia continued for a long time to stress the importance of Europe, the primordiality of rela-
tions with the EU and its adherence to the Council of Europe and in a more nuanced way 
the OSCE. In the Foreign Policy Concept of 2000 relations with European states are called 
a traditional foreign policy priority (Foreign Policy Concept, 2000, p. 7). The Concept 
of 2008 mentions that the Russian Federation is interested in strengthening the European 
Union (Foreign Policy Concept, 2008, p. 21) as well as the interaction mechanisms with 
it through the establishment of the Common Spaces agreed in 2003. The Foreign Policy 
Concept of 2013, shortly before the Ukraine crisis, is an interesting mix. On one hand, 
LQWKHDIWHUPDWKRIWKH3DUWQHUVKLSIRU0RGHUQLVDWLRQLWFRQ¿UPVWKH5XVVLDQLQWHUHVW
in enhancing cooperation with the European Union as its principal trade and economic 
counterpart and important foreign policy partner (Foreign Policy Concept, 2013, art. 57) 
It is also stated: 
Priority is given to relations with the Euro-Atlantic states which, besides geography, 
economy and history, have common deep-rooted civilizational ties with Russia. In 
OLJKWRIWKHLQFUHDVHGLPSRUWDQFHRIFRPELQLQJH൵RUWVRIDOOWKHVWDWHVLQWKHIDFHRI
WUDQVERUGHUFKDOOHQJHVDQGWKUHDWV5XVVLDVWDQGVIRUEXLOGLQJXSDWUXO\XQL¿HGUHJLRQ
without dividing lines through developing genuine partnership relations between Rus-
sia, the European Union and the United States. (Foreign Policy Concept, 2013, art. 54)
2QWKHRWKHUKDQGWKH&RQFHSWFRQ¿UPVDGL൵HUHQFHLQHPSKDVLVDVKLIWRIWKH
ZRUOG¶VFHQWUHVRIJUDYLW\ WR WKH$VLD3DFL¿F³7KHDELOLW\RI WKH:HVW WRGRPLQDWH
world economy and politics continues to diminish. The global power and development 
SRWHQWLDOLVQRZPRUHGLVSHUVHGDQGLVVKLIWLQJWRWKH(DVWSULPDULO\WRWKH$VLD3DFL¿F
region. The emergence of new global economic and political actors with Western coun-
tries trying to preserve their traditional positions enhances global competition, which is 
manifested in growing instability in international relations  (Foreign Policy Concept, 
2013, art. 6). As the US did under the Obama administration, Russia announced its own 
pivot to Asia. At this point, this remained largely rhetoric. The emphasis changed, but for 
Asia to take the place of Europe would inevitably be a long term process. Also the driving 
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role Russia plays in the BRICS consultations underlines the shift away from Europe and 
from the West in general.5 
In the Foreign Policy Concept of 2016 the EU is still called an important trade part-
ner, but otherwise all positive references to the EU and Euro-Atlantic states disappeared. 
In the context of the Ukraine crisis the tone of the document now revolves around the 
responsibility of Western states for the current crisis, because of the geopolitical ex-
pansion pursued by the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European 
Union (EU) along with their refusal to begin implementation of political statements re-
garding the creation of a common European security and cooperation framework and a 
containment policy by the US and their allies (Foreign Policy Concept, 2016, art. 61).
2IJUHDWVLJQL¿FDQFHZHUHWKH(XUDVLDQLQWHJUDWLRQLQLWLDWLYHVWKDWWRRNVKDSHDVRI
2010. Russia had always prioritised integration of the former Soviet states under its re-
gional leadership. Yet the Eurasian integration initiatives signalled an important change. 
For a long time, Russia had prioritised integration under the umbrella of the Common-
ZHDOWKRI,QGHSHQGHQW6WDWHV&,6EXWWKLVKDGUDUHO\EHHQH൵HFWLYH:LWKWKHSURSRVDO
of a Eurasian Union in 2011 Putin changed course to integration initiatives based on coa-
OLWLRQVRIWKHZLOOLQJ5XVVLD.D]DNKVWDQDQG%HODUXVLQWKH¿UVWSODFH,PSRUWDQWO\LQ
2011, Putin did not present the Eurasian Union as a rival or alternative for the EU, but as 
a powerful supranational association capable of becoming one of the poles in the modern 
ZRUOGDQGVHUYLQJDVDQH൶FLHQWEULGJHEHWZHHQ(XURSHDQGWKHG\QDPLF$VLD3DFL¿F
region (Putin, 2011).6 He added: 
Some of our neighbours explain their lack of interest in joining forward-looking inte-
gration projects in the post-Soviet space by saying that these projects contradict their 
pro-European stance. I believe that this is a false antithesis. We do not intend to cut 
RXUVHOYHVR൵QRUGRZHSODQWRVWDQGLQRSSRVLWLRQWRDQ\RQH7KH(XUDVLDQ8QLRQ
will be based on universal integration principles as an essential part of Greater Europe 
united by shared values of freedom, democracy, and market laws. Russia and the EU 
agreed to form a common economic space and coordinate economic regulations with-
out the establishment of supranational structures back in 2003. In line with this idea, 
we proposed setting up a harmonised community of economies stretching from Lisbon 
to Vladivostok, a free trade zone and even employing more sophisticated integration 
patterns. (Putin 2011) 
,WVKRXOGEHQRWHGWKDWWKHUHQHZHGFRQIURQWDWLRQEHWZHHQ5XVVLDDQGWKH:HVWGL൵HUVIXQGDPHQWDOO\
from the Cold War in that bipolarity and power symmetry have given way for a much more complex inter-
national system and a major power gap between the Euro-Atlantic Community and Russia.
7KLVWKRXJKWZDVUHSHDWHGLQGL൵HUHQWIRUPVLQUHVSHFWLYH)RUHLJQ3ROLF\&RQFHSWVZKHUHWKH(XU-
DVLDQ(FRQRPLF8QLRQZDVSUHVHQWHGDVDQ³H൵HFWLYHOLQNEHWZHHQ(XURSHDQGWKH$VLD3DFL¿FUHJLRQ´
(Foreign Policy Concept 2013, art. 44) or the priority was mentioned of harmonizing and aligning inter-
ests of European and Eurasian integration processes (Foreign Policy Concept 2016, art. 63).
31
,QWKLVIRUPXODWLRQWKHUHLVQRFRQWUDGLFWLRQZLWK*RUEDFKHY¶VDQGODWHUR൶FLDO5XVVLDQ
views on Greater Europe, multipolarity, interregional cooperation, a European-wide free 
trade area. Nor does Putin backtrack on the importance of the EU as primordial partner. 
Yet, this changed as mutual suspicion of the EU and Russia over each others integra-
tion projects increased. With the incompatibility of EU and Russian integration projects 
arising (see above) the tone shifted and Eurasian integration got presented as an alterna-
tive to cooperation with the EU, no longer a bridge. Fuelled by the Ukraine crisis the 
emphasis was put even more strongly on Eurasian cooperation and rivalling integration 
projects: the West was accused of countering integration processes and creating seats of 
tension in the Eurasian region (National Security Strategy, 2015, art. 17).
With the increasing use of references to Eurasian, the Euro-Atlantic space stopped 
being the key point of reference in Russian foreign policy, as it was under Medvedevs 
presidency. Yet, this as well is fraught with ambiguity. Eurasian economic integration 
itself is to a large extent modelled after the EU and thus represents a neoliberal template 
(Morozov, 2018, p. 35). Yet, at the same time the term Eurasian can have geopolitical 
RUFLYLOL]DWLRQDOFRQQRWDWLRQV,WLVDGL൶FXOWWHUPWRXVHDVLWUHSUHVHQWVPDQ\VWUDQGV
generations and degrees of radicalism. Yet, with an increasing emphasis on Eurasian 
DVDTXDOL¿HUWKHTXHVWLRQFDQEHUDLVHGZKHWKHU(XUDVLDQLVPLVVWLOOWKH³PHWDSKRULFDO
dog that did not bark which Natalia Morozova claimed it to be under Putin at the time 
of writing (Morozova, 2009, p. 683). 
5. Conclusion
Even though Gorbachevs concept of Common European Home was short-lived, many of 
LWVFHQWUDOLGHDVVXUYLYHGWKH6RYLHW8QLRQDQGFRQWLQXHGWRLQÀXHQFH5XVVLDQIRUHLJQSROLF\
rhetoric for many years. Ideas of a multipolar Europe with pan-European indivisible collec-
tive security, rooted in law and with a free trade area from Lisbon to Vladivostok continued 
to be hallmarks of Russias European policy discourse until fairly recently. But some major 
changes also occurred. Not least the context. With views of the post-Cold War European se-
curity order at loggerheads, relations came to be dominated by a logic of competition and 
distrust, in contrast to the cooperative atmosphere of the late Gorbachev years. In this context 
some words obtained substantially new meanings and often became an instrument for de-
fence rather than cooperation. Secondly, the idea of a common European civilisation of which 
Russia was an essential part disappeared. The interpretation that a civilizational competition 
LVWDNLQJSODFHJDLQHGJURXQG7KHLQÀXHQFHRIGHHSO\FRQVHUYDWLYHYLHZVWKDW5XVVLDUHSUH-
sents the genuine values of Europe, which the West has betrayed, has grown strongly. Today 
Russia sets itself apart from (the rest of) Europe. Finally, Europe has lost its central role and 
the positive evaluation of the EU as primordial partner has faded away. Moscow announced 
its own pivot to Asia but also invested in its own Eurasian integration projects. While the 
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latter were introduced as complementary, Russian and EU-driven integration projects have 
increasingly become rivalling and contentious issues. Several of these developments have 
RFFXUUHGLQWKH\HDUVEHIRUHWKH8NUDLQHFULVLVEXWWKHODWWHUKDVGH¿QLWHO\IXHOOHGDQGUDGL-
calised this evolution. The real rupture with the original Common European Home concept 
is thus not so much Putins ascent to power, but the tensions leading up to the confrontation 
over Ukraine and the escalation the crisis itself produced. Within a context of a re-emerging 
Russia and domestic change, as well as tensions over NATO enlargement and the missile 
defence shield, trust between Russia and the rest of Europe dwindled and gradually made 
way for zero-sum thinking. Without abandoning them altogether, some key terms in Rus-
sias vision of Europe were given a new role in a counter-hegemonic discourse, challenging 
the dominant position of the Euro-Atlantic Community.
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